A supplier is known to be subject to opportunism when contracting secretly with downstream competitors, particularly when downstream firms have "passive beliefs". We stress that in many situations, an equilibrium with passive beliefs may not exist and passive beliefs appear less plausible than "wary beliefs", introduced by McAffee and Schwartz, that account for multilateral deviations. We show that in a broad range of situations, equilibria with wary beliefs exist and reflect opportunism. Last, we confirm the insight, derived by O'Brien and Shaffer using a more ad-hoc equilibrium concept, that RPM eliminates the scope for opportunism. JEL Classification: D84, L14, L42
Introduction
When an upstream Þrm (a manufacturer, say) supplies several downstream competitors (e.g., retailers), it has an interest to restrict its supply so as to maintain high prices and proÞts, which it can then share with the downstream Þrms. However, if the upstream Þrm can deal secretly with one downstream competitor, it then has an incentive to "freeride" on the other competitors and is thus tempted to supply additional quantities. Hart and Tirole (1990) (hereafter HT) have been the Þrst to formally study this potential opportunism and show that it may prevent the upstream Þrm from fully exerting its market power. This insight, developed in a context where downstream Þrms compete à la Cournot, has since been conÞrmed by O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) (hereafter OS) for the case of Bertrand competition and by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) (hereafter MS) for alternative reactions to contract "renegotiations." This inability to exert full market power gives the upstream Þrm an incentive to reduce downstream competition, e.g., by favoring (or integrating) one competitor over its rivals. OS have pointed out that Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), whereby the retail price of a product is set by the manufacturer rather than by the retailer, also allows a manufacturer to eliminate such risk of opportunism; the idea is that, through RPM, a manufacturer can squeeze retail margins (by setting retail prices close to wholesale ones); then, when dealing with one retailer, the manufacturer has no longer an incentive to free-ride on the others' sales, since the manufacturer obtains the entire margin on these sales.
A key issue for the analysis of these situations is how downstream competitors react to "unexpected" (i.e., out-of-equilibrium) offers. Their willingness to accept such offers depends in turn on their beliefs regarding the offers made to their rivals. Intuitively, there is little scope for opportunism if the competitors are highly "cautious" about unexpected offers. If for example all competitors assume that the supplier is "ßooding the market" whenever it proposes to supply below the monopoly price, they would respond negatively to such offers -and the supplier may thus be able to sustain the monopoly price. If instead competitors are more optimistic when receiving unexpected offers, they might be more receptive to "special deals", which in turn may exacerbate the supplier's temptation to ßood the market. HT have argued that, in a Cournot-like context where Þrst the upstream Þrm supplies given quantities at given prices, and then downstream Þrms compete for consumers, market competition, it is natural to assume that downstream competitors have "passive" or "market-by-market" beliefs, whereby they expect the supplier to stick to the equilibrium contracts with their rivals even if it makes them an out-of-equilibrium offer. The reason is that, in such a Cournot-like context, the quantity actually sold to one downstream Þrm does not directly affect the proÞt that the supplier derives from its contracts with the other Þrms. Therefore, there is arguably no reason to believe that a deviation on one contract would trigger a deviation on other contracts. Passive beliefs are also convenient in that they are usually easy to study, and they have been used as well by OS (in a slightly different way, as we explain below) and by MS.
We stress however below that the strategic "independence" between the contracts signed with the different competitors disappears when downstream competition is more Bertrand-like and/or when downstream Þrms Þnd out which contracts were signed before actually competing in the Þnal market. In all these cases, the contract signed with one competitor directly affects the proÞtability of the contracts signed with the other competitors. This has two implications. First, there may not exist any equilibrium with passive beliefs. The reason comes from the fact that, because of contract interdependency, the gain from a multilateral deviation may exceed the total gains of the unilateral deviations.
Second, downstream Þrms should anticipate that, if the supplier deviates with one of them, it has an incentive to change the contracts offered to the others. Passive beliefs appear thus less plausible. We propose to consider instead the notion of wary beliefs introduced by MS: when it receives an unexpected offer, a downstream Þrm then anticipates that the supplier acts optimally with its rivals, given the offer just received. We provide two types of result. First, we show that there exists wary beliefs equilibria, even when passive beliefs equilibria fail to exist, and that these equilibria exhibit some degree of opportunism: the upstream Þrm does not fully exploit its market power, although it performs better than when downstream Þrms have passive beliefs. Second, in the Bertrand setting analyzed by OS, we conÞrm their insight regarding RPM: with RPM, there exists a wary beliefs equilibrium where the upstream Þrm fully exploits its market power.
Framework
The framework is a simpliÞed version of the model proposed by OS. An upstream manufacturer M sells a product to Þnal consumers through two differentiated retailers R 1 and R 2 . The manufacturer produces with constant marginal cost c, while each retailer R i operates at zero cost and faces a demand D i (p 1 , p 2 ) that is differentiable, downward slopping in p i and decreases when the two prices p 1 and p 2 increase uniformly.
To simplify exposition, we will assume that (i) demand is symmetric:
and (ii) when the wholesale price is set at marginal cost, price competition leads retailers to charge the same Bertrand price p B , characterized
These assumptions imply that the inverse demand function is also symmetric: P i (q 1 , q 2 ) = P (q i , q j ) and differentiable. We will further assume that ∂ 1 P < ∂ 2 P < 0 and that, when the wholesale price is set at marginal cost, quantity competition leads the retailers to sell the same Cournot quantity q C , characterized by q
Last we suppose that, for any q i and q j such that P (q i , q j ) > 0,
We model the interactions between the manufacturer and its retailers as a noncooperative game:
1. M makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each retailer; each retailer only observes its own offer and decides whether to accept it or not. For the sake of exposition, we will focus on two-part tariffs, of the form t i (q i ) = f i + w i q i , which we will denote by In the following sections, we analyze different situations with respect to the nature of downstream competition and the available information. We will consider both quantity and price competition on the downstream market; in the Þrst case, the retailers set simultaneously the quantity they order and sell on the Þnal market; 2 in the second case, retailers set retail prices and order quantities so as to satisfy demand. Following MS, we also consider two possible information structures: the accepted contracts can either be observed by both retailers before competing on the downstream market (interim observability game) or not (interim unobservability game).
Passive beliefs
Analyzing the equilibria of this game requires an assumption on how retailers revise their beliefs about the offers made to rivals, when receiving an "unexpected" (i.e., outof-equilibrium) offer. We will suppose in this section that retailers do not revise their beliefs: that is, each retailer keeps assuming that the manufacturer offers the equilibrium 1 In what follows, two-part tariffs are always part of a best response; an equilibrium in two-part tariffs is thus a "true" equilibrium, even considering unrestricted sets of contracts; however, there may exist additional equilibria in which two-part tariffs are not used. 2 In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the retailers directly set quantities. As in HT, we could have assumed that the retailers order quantities Þrst and then compete in prices.
contract to the rival retailer, even when receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer. This is the so-called "passive beliefs" or "market-by-market conjectures" assumption used both by HT and by MS.
Opportunism
Let us Þrst determine the equilibrium with passive beliefs in a Cournot setting with interim unobservability. With passive beliefs each retailer R i anticipates that its rival receives the equilibrium offer and thus put on the market the equilibrium quantity q e j . Therefore, in response to a contract t i , R i chooses a quantity
and accepts the contract as long as the corresponding proÞt is not negative. The manufacturer uses the franchise fees to extract all retail proÞts:
and thus sets wholesale prices so as to maximize:
Each wholesale price w i affects this proÞt only through
, which by construction is maximized for Q i (c). Therefore, in equilibrium, the manufacturer charges wholesale prices equal to the marginal cost; there thus exists a unique equilibrium, which coincides with the standard Cournot equilibrium: This result, originally due to HT, is very intuitive. With passive beliefs each retailer R i anticipates that its rival will stick to the equilibrium quantity q e j and is thus willing to pay up to P ¡ q i + q e j ¢ for any given quantity q i . Since M can monitor the retail choice of q i through the wholesale price w i and recover any expected proÞt through the franchise fee f i , it will "choose" q i so as to maximize
which is achieved for the
Cournot best response to q e j . As in HT, the manufacturer is thus subject to opportunism and non linear wholesale contracts do not allow it to fully exploit its monopoly power.
Inexistence problems
Passive beliefs are convenient and usually lead to tractable results. They are also close in spirit to the "contract equilibria" introduced by Crémer and Riordan (1987) and used in a Bertrand setting by OS. This concept focuses on pairwise deviations: M and R i sign the best contract, given the contract signed with R j ; in contrast, a perfect equilibrium with passive beliefs must also resist multilateral deviations, where the manufacturer simultaneously deviates with both retailers. Hence, any passive beliefs equilibrium is a contract equilibrium, but a contract equilibrium is not a passive beliefs equilibrium if it does not survive to multilateral deviations.
It is easy to check that multilateral deviations are not more relevant than unilateral deviations in the above Cournot setting where retailers never observe each other's contracts.
The producer's proÞt is of the form:
where f i and q i denote respectively the fee paid and the quantity actually sold by R i .
Since R i does not observe the offer t j made to its rival before accepting or rejecting its own offer, f i cannot depend on t j . In addition, when retailers compete in a Cournot fashion and never observe each other's contracts, the actual quantity q i also depends only on the offer t i made to R i , and not on t j (it will of course depends on R i 's belief about t j , but cannot depend on the actual t j ). Therefore, the two contracts affect the proÞt expression (3) in a separable way: the Þrst two terms of the proÞt expression depend on t 1 only, while the other two terms depend on t 2 only. The impact of a multilateral deviation is thus simply the sum of the impacts of each unilateral deviation, implying that any contract equilibrium is also a perfect equilibrium with passive beliefs (that is, the two concepts coincide here).
We stress below that multilateral deviations may matter and prevent the existence of an equilibrium when retailers observe each other's contracts before choosing their quantities (interim observability) and/or when retailers compete in prices à la Bertrand. The quantity eventually sold by one retailer then depends on the offer actually made to the other retailer, thereby destroying the above-mentioned separability. 3 Consider for example the case where retailers compete à la Bertrand and never observe each other's contracts. Then, the price charged by R i still depends only on the offer made to that retailer:
but the quantity q i eventually sold by R i depends on both wholesale prices:
Therefore, the proÞt expression (3) is no longer separable in w 1 and w 2 : each wholesale price w i has an effect on the wholesale revenue (w j − c) Q j (w 1 , w 2 ) generated by the other retailer and the impact of a multilateral deviation thus no longer adds-up those of unilateral deviations. Whenever this cross effect is sufficiently important, the manufacturer's objective is not concave and a multilateral deviation can be attractive even when unilateral deviations are not. The following proposition shows that indeed, multilateral deviations destroy the unique candidate equilibrium identiÞed by OS when the two retailers are sufficiently good substitutes. Let
denote the direct and cross elasticities of the demand, evaluated at the Bertrand equilibrium. We have:
Proposition 2 In a price setting with interim unobservability, there exists no perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs when the elasticity of substitution is large enough,
Proof. In the price setting, if there exists an equilibrium of the interim unobservability game with passive beliefs, this equilibrium is identical to the contract equilibrium characterized by OS. Hence the unique equilibrium involves differentiable wholesale tariffs, with marginal wholesale prices equal to the manufacturer's marginal cost, c and retail prices equal to p B .
4
Consider now a "double-sided deviation" based on wholesale prices (w 1 , w 2 ); under passive beliefs, R i is willing to pay up to
4 OS show that these are the only contract equilibria, without any prior restriction on the contracts.
All equilibria lead to the same retail prices and quantities, and one of them involves two-part tariffs of
where
. The manufacturer's proÞt is:
A bilateral deviation of the form w 1 = w 2 = c + ε is proÞtable whenever ∂ 2 11 π P (c, c) + ∂ 2 12 π P (c, c) > 0. From the above expression,
To compute ∂ 2 11 π P (c, c), note that
Therefore,
and thus (using
A bilateral deviation of the form w 1 = w 2 = c + ε is thus proÞtable when
Thus, no equilibrium exists in the Bertrand-like framework with interim unobservability when the elasticity of substitution is higher than half of the direct elasticity at the Bertrand equilibrium prices. A similar observation applies when retailers observe each other's contracts before choosing their prices or quantities. The quantity q i sold by R i then depends again on the actual offers made to the two retailers, 5 and multilateral deviations may be proÞtable even when unilateral deviations are not. Suppose for example that demand is linear and given by:
5 Denoting by q C (w i , w j ) and p B (w i , w j ) the standard Cournot quantities and Bertrand prices for wholesale prices w i and w j , the quantity sold by R i is q i = q C (w i , w j ) when retailers compete in a Cournot fashion and
The parameter β reßects the degree of substitution between the two retailers: β = 0 corresponds to local monopolies, and β = 1 to perfect substitution. When retailers compete à la Bertrand and never observe each other's contracts, from the above proposition there is no equilibrium when β > 1 2
; when retailers observe each other's contracts (whether they compete in a Bertrand or Cournot fashion), Appendix A shows that there is similarly no equilibrium when β > b β ≈ 0.806. 6 
Wary beliefs
Passive or "market-by-market" beliefs are plausible in the above Cournot context. 7 The secrecy of the contracts then implies that, from the point of view of the upstream monopolist, the two retailers form two separate markets (even though retailers themselves perceive a strong interdependency). The producer has no incentive to change the offer to one retailer when altering the contract signed with the rival retailer: what matters is the retailer's anticipation about the quantity bought by its rival, not the quantity actually bought.
As already noted, this independence disappears when either retailers compete in a
Bertrand fashion or when they observe rivals' contracts before ordering their own quantities. In these situations, modifying the contract offered to one retailer affects the other retailer's realized sales. Recognizing this point, MS suggested that retailers' beliefs should be consistent with the producers' incentives. As we will see, opting for consistent beliefs also helps restoring the existence of an equilibrium. 8 6 Caprice (2002) considers the case where contracts remain unobserved but retailers observe each other's acceptance decisions. This observability of acceptance decisions does not raise existence problems, but alters the equilibrium contracts when retailers have access to an alternative source of supply (a competitive but less efficient fringe, say); the manufacturer has then an incentive to lower the marginal wholesale price when acceptance decisions are observed: this makes one retailer "more aggressive" when the other refuses the contract, and thus reduces retailers' rents. 7 The same applies to the Cournot-like context analyzed by HT, where the producer supplies given quantities to retailers before they compete for the Þnal consumers; retailers are then capacity constrained by their previous orders and, in equilibrium, sell their quantities at the market price. 8 There may also exist equilibria with other types of beliefs. For example, "symmetric conjectures", in which each retailer believes that the producer always treat both retailers in the same way (even out of the equilibrium), generates an equilibrium with monopoly prices (hence the producer can fully exploits its monopoly power under this particular type of belief). We show in this paper that monopoly prices cannot be sustained with wary beliefs. Segal and Whinston (2001) point out that allowing the producer to offer menus of contracts and choose quantities once retailers have accepted or rejected the offer reduces somewhat the set of possible equilibria for any belief, and that all equilibrium outcomes must converge towards the competitive one when a strict competitive equilibrium exists (that is, when the marginal cost Note that retailers must form beliefs not only about the contract offered to their rivals, but also about the quantities or prices charged by their rivals (which in turn depend on rivals's beliefs). With passive beliefs, this issue is moot: since R i believes that R j received the equilibrium contract, it must believe that R j anticipates that its rival also received the equilibrium contract and will thus sell the equilibrium quantity (in the Cournot-like setting) or charge the equilibrium price (in the Bertrand-like framework). R i thus chooses the best response to the equilibrium quantity q e j or price p e j , given the contract offered to itself. However, if R i believes that the producer also offered an unexpected offer to R j , R i is likely to anticipate a change in R j 's behavior. It is natural to assume that R i will then expect R j to optimally react to the producer's unexpected offer. MS thus proposed the notion of wary beliefs:
DeÞnition 3 Wary beliefs
When R i receives a contract t i , it believes that:
1. the manufacturer expects it to accept this contract, 2. the manufacturer offers R j (j 6 = i) the contract T j (t i ) that is the best for the monopolist, among all contracts acceptable to R j , 3. R j reasons the same way.
Quantity competition with interim unobservability
Let us Þrst consider the Cournot-like framework in which retailers compete in quantities and where contracts are never observable. When being offered a contract
and R j to accept it. Then, since R i 's quantity constitute the best reply to rival's anticipated quantity, it must solve
In addition, R i will accept a contract (w i , f i ) if and only if the franchise fee f i is lower than the retail expected proÞt, that is
It remains to determine the retailers' beliefs T j (t i ). In the case of wary beliefs, when R i is offered a tariff t i it anticipates that M offers and R j accepts a tariff T j (t i ) given by:
of production is strictly increasing).
The solution to this program does not depend on t i . Therefore, the conjectures formed by retailer R i are independent of the contract it received and thus T j (t i ) = t * j , the equilibrium offer. In this Cournot framework with interim unobservability, wary beliefs are thus equivalent to passive beliefs: 9 Proposition 4 In the quantity setting with interim unobservability, wary beliefs are equivalent to passive beliefs; there thus exists a unique equilibrium with wary beliefs characterized by
This equivalence is the underlying reason behind the plausibility of passive beliefs already noted by HT and recalled above for the Cournot setting with interim unobservability. We now show that this equivalence breaks down when contracts are interim observable or when Þrms compete in a Bertrand setting.
Interim observability
We assume in this section that contracts are interim observable: contract offers are initially secret (acceptance decisions are therefore based on beliefs) but retailers observe the accepted contracts before competing (in prices or in quantities) on the Þnal market.
The equilibrium of the retail competition subgame is therefore the solution of a standard
which the Þrms face costs equal to w i and w j . In what follows, we denote by q R (w i , w j ) , p R (w i , w j ) and π R (w i , w j ), the retail quantity, price and proÞt emerging from the retail competition subgame:
• In the case of quantity competition:
• In the case of price competition:
9 We denote the equilibrium retail price by p i,j , where i = C (resp. B) in the Cournot-like (resp.
Bertrand-like) case, and j = O (resp. U ) when contracts are interim observable (resp. unobservable).
p B and p M are respectively the standard Bertrand and monopoly prices, and
standard Cournot price.
• In both cases the retail proÞt is given by:
When being offered a contract t i = (f i , w i ), R i again expects M to offer and R j to accept a tariff T j (t i ) given by:
Clearly, the solution of this program does not depend on f i . And since the objective function is strictly increasing in f j , the constraint must be binding. The rival's anticipated contract is thus given by:
and
In contrast with the Cournot case with interim unobservability, the objective function in (5) is no longer separable in w i and w j . This implies that the beliefs will now depend on w i . Wary beliefs thus differ from passive beliefs.
10
M chooses wholesale prices w * 1 and w * 2 that maximize its proÞt given the acceptable franchise fees:
In particular, the equilibrium wholesale prices (w * 1 , w * 2 ) constitute a Þxed point of the functions (W 1 , W 2 ):
10 MS adopt a different formulation, which relies on the retail equilibrium that would be generated by wholesale prices (w 1 , w 2 ) if they were common beliefs. This formulation is well adapted to the case where contracts are observed at the retail competition stage but can be misleading otherwise. In particular, they assert that, with interim unobservability, wary beliefs equilibria coincide with passive beliefs equilibria. This is correct when retailers compete à la Cournot, because in that case the producer's proÞt is separable in w 1 and w 2 (implying that W j (w i ) is independent from w i ). However, as we will show later, with Bertrand downstream competition the producer's proÞt is no longer separable (w 1 affects R 1 's retail price, which thus affects the producer's sales through R 2 ), and wary beliefs equilibria differ from passive beliefs equilibria.
In the remainder of this section, for tractability we assume that demand is linear:
The following proposition provides some characterization of wary beliefs equilibria. We
Þrst focus on beliefs W 1 and W 2 that are polynomial functions of, respectively, w 2 and w 1 . We then consider symmetric equilibria, without restriction on beliefs.
Proposition 5 When contracts are interim observable, wary beliefs no longer coincide with passive beliefs. If demand is linear and retailers have wary beliefs, then: (i) there exists a unique equilibrium with polynomial beliefs and this equilibrium is symmetric; and
(ii) in any symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium retail price is strictly lower than the monopoly price and the manufacturer therefore does not obtain the monopoly proÞt.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Therefore, in contrast to the case of passive beliefs, there always exists an equilibrium with wary beliefs. Retailers being now more "suspicious" about the manufacturer's behavior, out-of-equilibrium offers are more likely to be rejected, which ensures the existence of an equilibrium. In the set of polynomial beliefs, this equilibrium is unique (beliefs are then affine functions of wholesale prices) and symmetric. However, if wary beliefs reduce the scope for opportunism, they do not completely eliminate this problem and the manufacturer cannot maintain monopoly prices. The opportunism problem is thus "robust", in the sense that it does not critically depend on a particular choice of equilibrium concept (contract equilibrium, passive or wary beliefs equilibria, and Cournot or Bertrand retail competition).
Price competition with interim unobservability
Let us Þnally consider the remaining case, where retailers compete in prices and never observe each other's contracts. When being offered a contract
and R j to accept it. Then, since R i 's price constitute the best reply to rival's anticipated price, it must solve
In addition, R i accepts a contract (f i , w i ) if and only if the franchise fee f i is lower than the retail expected proÞt, that is
With wary beliefs, when R i is offered t i it anticipates that M offers and R j accepts the wholesale contract T j (t i ) given by:
In contrast with the previous cases, we cannot rule out that the beliefs are function not only of the wholesale price w i , but also of the franchise fee f i -in which case the participation constraint is not guaranteed to be binding. This potential dependence of beliefs on franchise fees is however rather artiÞcial; it comes from the fact that R i 's beliefs T j (t i ) affects its price response P i (t i ), which in turn affects the determination of T j (.).
If we restrict attention on beliefs that do not depend on franchise fees, we obtain similar results to those obtained for the case of interim observability.
Proposition 6
When contracts are interim unobservable and retailers compete à la Bertrand, wary beliefs do not coincide with passive beliefs. If demand is linear and retailers have wary beliefs that only depend on wholesale prices, then: (i) there exists a unique equilibrium with polynomial beliefs, and this equilibrium is symmetric; and (ii) in any symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium retail price is lower than the monopoly price.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Price comparisons
Wary beliefs mitigate somewhat the scope for opportunism. In particular, they eliminate the equilibrium inexistence problem. We also show in appendices B and C that, while wary beliefs coincide with passive beliefs in the case of Cournot competition and interim unobservability, in all other cases wary beliefs (symmetric) equilibrium prices are above the level achieved in passive beliefs equilibria (when they exist). The intuition is that when a retailer is offered a higher wholesale price than expected, with wary beliefs he anticipates that the other retailer also receives a higher wholesale price, 11 and is thus willing to pay a higher franchise fee than with passive beliefs; this, in turn, encourages the manufactuer to offer higher wholesale prices, leading to higher retail prices as well.
11 That is, W 0 i > 0. The expression of the manufacturer's proÞt is of the form
so that the optimal w 2 indeed increases with w 1 (given the linearity of demand and of retail behavior,
The above propositions however show that wary beliefs do not entirely eliminate the scope for opportunism, since prices remain below the monopoly level. In addition one can check that, for the unique equilibrium with polynomial beliefs, and for any 0 < β < 1 and 0 ≤ c < 1 (with p i,j P denoting the candidate equilibrium retail price with passive beliefs):
Thus, with wary beliefs prices are lower with retail Cournot competition than with retail Bertrand competition. This comes from the fact that, while price competition is more intense than quantity competition for given wholesale prices, the manufacturer's opportunism is moderated in the Bertrand setting, leading to higher wholesale prices -and sufficiently higher to offset the lower retail margin. Consider for example the interim unobservability case. When retailers compete in quantities, wary beliefs then coincide with passive beliefs and lead to the standard Cournot outcome. In the Bertrand setting, the actual quantities sold by the two retailers are interdependent: retailers anticipate that their rival will be charged a higher price when they are themselves charged a higher price, which in turn encourages the manufacturer to maintain relatively higher prices. A similar argument applies when the contracts are interim observable, although actual quantities are now interdependent in both settings. The gap between the equilibrium prices under Cournot and Bertrand is reduced, since contract interim observability makes the outcome more competitive in Bertrand but less competitive in Cournot. As in HT for Cournot downstream competition, the scope for opportunism comes from the fact that, when negotiating with R i , M has an incentive to free-ride on R j 's margin. A solution to this free-riding problem is to squeeze R j 's margin, which can be achieved by imposing a price ceiling equal to the (marginal) wholesale price: this removes the manufacturer's incentives to engage in opportunism and restores the credibility of monopoly prices.
Wary beliefs
As already discussed, the concept of "contract equilibrium" is intuitive but does not coincide with the equilibrium of a well-deÞned game. In addition, the related notion of passive beliefs equilibrium is subject to inexistence problems, which potentially limits the relevance of the analysis. However, using wary beliefs, one can check that the insight of OS is robust.
Suppose that contracts consist of a two-part tariff, together with an imposed retail price. There is thus no actual retail competition; and when receiving an offer (f i , w i ; p i ), R i must anticipate not only the two-part tariff t j offered to its competitor, but also the imposed retail price p j . We have:
Proposition 8 In the price competition setting with RPM contracts, there exists an equilibrium with wary beliefs where prices and the producer's proÞt are at the monopoly level.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition is the same as in OS's analysis of contract equilibria. The manufacturer's opportunism problem arises when retail margins are strictly positive. Then, when M signs a contract with R 1 , M is interested by the quantity sold through R 2 because of its margin w 2 − c but does not take into account R 2 ' margin p 2 − w 2 . Whenever this retail margin is positive, M does not entirely internalize the effect of a cut in price p 1 , which leads to prices lower than the monopoly level. With RP M, M can however set both the wholesale prices and the retail prices at the monopoly level, thereby eliminating retailers' margins and the source of its opportunistic behavior.
Concluding remarks
The above analysis shows that wary beliefs provide a reasonable alternative to passive or market-by-market beliefs whenever the contract actually offered to one downstream Þrm affects the upstream monopolist's incentives when dealing with the other downstream
Þrm. Whenever such interdependence arises: (i) an equilibrium with passive beliefs may not exist, due to the fact that multilateral deviations may become attractive; and (ii) passive beliefs differ from and are arguably less plausible than wary beliefs. We also
show that an equilibrium with wary beliefs exists and reßects the "opportunism" problem generated by contract secrecy.
The analysis also shows that, while the contract equilibrium concept adopted by O'Brien and Shaffer is debatable, their insight is robust: when considering equilibria with wary beliefs, RPM allows the manufacturer to solve its commitment problem and maintain monopoly prices. Another way to test the robustness of this insight consists in reverting to public contracts, but assuming that the manufacturer deals with the retailers in sequence, as in the following three-stage game:
1. M publicly offers R 1 a wholesale two-part tariff t 1 (q) = f 1 + w 1 q, which R 1 publicly accepts or refuses.
2. M publicly offers R 2 a wholesale two-part tariff t 2 (q) = f 2 + w 2 q, which R 2 publicly accepts or refuses. 
A Interim observability and passive beliefs
We show that there is no passive beliefs equilibrium when contracts are interim observable and the substitutability parameter is large
A.1 Quantity competition
At the last stage of the game, each retailer sets the quantity it buys and resells, having observed the contract received (and accepted) by its competitor. Given the linear demand, the retail equilibrium is unique and "symmetric"; quantities and retail proÞts are given by:
When receiving an offer (f i , w i ) , R i anticipates that R j received the equilibrium offer and therefore faces a marginal cost equal to w * j . R i thus accepts the offer if
M chooses w * 1 and w * 2 so as to maximize its proÞt given the acceptable franchise fees: (w * 1 , w * 2 ) = arg max (w1,w2) π P (w 1 , w 2 ), where
First-order conditions lead to a unique candidate equilibrium:
while second-order derivatives are given by
Second-order conditions (|∂ 
A.2 Price competition
The proof is similar for the case of price competition. Equilibrium retail prices and proÞts are given by:
The manufacturer's proÞt π P thus becomes, as a function of wholesale prices
The candidate equilibrium is:
and second-order derivatives are:
Second-order conditions are therefore again satisÞed only if β ≤ b β.
B Interim observability: proof of Proposition 5
This Appendix studies wary beliefs equilibria for the case where contracts are interim observable.
B.1 Quantity competition
When being offered a wholesale price w i , R i expects M to offer and R j to accept a wholesale price W j (w i ) and a franchise fee F j (w i ). R i thus accept the contract (f i , w i ) if
. Wary beliefs must satisfy:
The Þrst-order condition characterizing the beliefs is thus:
Given the acceptable franchise fees characterized by (10), M chooses w * 1 and w * 2 so as to maximize:
Note that beliefs satisfy:
and that equilibrium wholesale prices (w *
B.1.1 Polynomial beliefs
We focus here on polynomial wary beliefs, of the form
and characterize the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium with such beliefs. We Þrst show below that beliefs are affine and symmetric. We then check that there exists a unique equilibrium and that it satisÞes q * > q M .
• Any polynomial wary belief is affine (n 1 = n 2 = 1) .
Regrouping the terms in (W j ) yields:
This implies n j ≥ 1. And n i > 1 would imply 2n i − 1 ≥ max (n i , 3), in which case the last term would dominate, a contradiction. (W 1 ) and (W 2 ) thus impose n 1 = n 2 = 1, that is, the beliefs are of the form W i (w) = ω i,0 + ω i,1 w.
• Any equilibrium with affine wary beliefs is such that ω 1,1 = ω 2,1 .
Focusing on the linear terms, (W 1 ) and (W 2 ) impose:
Substracting these two conditions yields:
Differentiating (11) with respect to w implies:
The second-order conditions of the manufacturer's program impose ∂ 2 11 π P , ∂ 2 22 π P ≤ 0. Therefore,
and (14) thus imposes ω 1,1 = ω 2,1 = ω 1 . Condition (12) thus simpliÞes to
• There exists a unique ω * 1 satisfying (17) and second-order conditions.
The second-order cross derivative of the manufacturer's proÞt π P is positive:
The second-order conditions of the manufacturer's program are ∂ • There exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric.
Focusing on the constant terms and using ω 1,1 = ω 2,1 = ω 1 , conditions (W 1 ) and (W 2 )
impose:
Substracting these two conditions leads to:
and the above two conditions reduce to:
¢ .
This shows that there exists a unique solution to the overall program, and that this solution is symmetric. The equilibrium wholesale price is deÞned by
B.1.2 Any symmetric equilibrium price satisÞes q
We show here that the quantity is strictly lower than the monopoly level in any symmetric equilibrium (without any prior restriction on beliefs). The proof is in two steps: we Þrst rule out quantities below the monopoly level using the second-order conditions of the manufacturer's program, and then the monopoly level itself by exhibiting a proÞtable deviation.
• In any symmetric equilibrium with wary beliefs, the quantity is not lower than the monopoly quantity.
In a symmetric equilibrium, (W i ) simpliÞes to:
Using w * = W (w * ), this yields
Differentiating (11) with respect to w further implies:
The second-order conditions of the manufacturer's maximization program are ∂ 
The equilibrium wholesale price is again deÞned by
and the equilibrium retail price is:
.
B.2.2 Any symmetric equilibrium price is below the monopoly price
As for the quantity competition case, we use the second-order conditions of the manufacturer's program to rule out any price strictly higher than the monopoly price. We then show that the monopoly price cannot be sustained at the equilibrium.
• In any symmetric equilibrium with wary beliefs, the equilibrium retail price does not exceed the monopoly price.
At a symmetric equilibrium, (W i ) reduces to (W i ) simplify to:
We now have
C Price competition and interim unobservability
We study here price competition with interim unobservability, and focus on beliefs W j (w i ) that depend only on the wholesale price (not on the franchise fee). R i 's best reply to the R j 's anticipated retail price P j (W j (w i )), for i 6 = j = 1, 2, is then given by:
The Þrst-order condition is necessary and sufficient; it writes as:
Wary beliefs satisfy:
Moreover, using (P j ) we have:
The following Þrst-order condition (29) then implicitly deÞnes the belief W j (w i ):
C.1 Polynomial beliefs
Let us now consider the polynomial solutions to the system consisting of equations
We denote by n i and m i the degrees of W i and P i , and by ω i,k and p i,k the coefficients of their terms of degree k:
• Any polynomial solution is affine (0 ≤ m 1 , m 2 , n 1 , n 2 ≤ 1).
Consider (P i ):
Three cases can arise:
1. m i < m j n j . This implies m i = 0 and m j = n j = 1. Then (W i ) reduces to
and thus n i = 1.
2. m i > m j n j . This implies m i = 1 and m j n j = 0. Thus, either m j = 0 or m j > 0 and n j = 0.
(a) The case m j = 0 is similar to case 1 (reverting the roles of i and j).
and therefore m j = max (n i , 1) . If n i ≤ 1, then no degree exceeds 1. The only remaining case is m j = n j ≥ 2. Since m i = 1 and n j = 0, equation
Differentiating (W i ) and (P j ) twice then yields respectively 3. m i = m j n j ≥ 1. In this case, either m j = m i n i ≥ 1 or all degrees are equal or lower than 1 (simply invert roles played by i and j in cases 1 and 2). m i = m j n j ≥ 1 and m j = m i n i ≥ 1 imply n i = n j = 1 and m j = m i = m ≥ 1. The only interesting case is when m ≥ 2. Then (W j ) yields:
which contradicts m > 1.
This concludes the proof and shows that polynomial solutions must be affine.
• Any equilibrium with affine wary beliefs satisÞes π 1,1 = π 2,1 and ω 1,1 = ω 2,1 .
With affine beliefs, (P i ) reduces to
and since it holds for any w, it implies
(32 i ) and (32 j ) yield
and thus:
Similarly, (W j ) implies:
Using (32) to replace π j,1 ω j,1 in (35) yields:
Substracting (36 j ) to (36 i ), we have:
which, combined with (33), imposes:
But the second-order conditions of the manufacturer's program impose 0 ≤ ω 1,1 ω 2,1 ≤ 1.
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Therefore, (38) imposes π 1,1 = π 2,1 = π 1 and thus ω 1,1 = ω 2,1 = ω 1 .
Given the symmetry, (32) and (35) simplify to
13 Beliefs satisfy
ii π P and the second-order conditions of the manufacturer's program impose
• There exists a unique pair (π * 1 , ω * 1 ) satisfying (39) and (40) as well as secondorder conditions. Let us use (39) to eliminate ω 1 in (40):
The left-hand side is a polynomial ϕ of degree 3 such that:
Therefore, ϕ has three roots: one in ¤ 0,
Using the retailers's responses, the manufacturer's proÞt can be expressed as
C.2 Any symmetric equilibrium price is below the monopoly level Using symmetry, (P i ) and (W i ) simplify to
In a symmetric equilibrium,
and thus (49) yields:
while (unless mentioned otherwise, all expressions are evaluated at the equilibrium w * ) 
imposes
and thus, in equilibrium:
which implies (since P 0 W 0 > 0 if P 0 > 0):
Together, (50) and (51) yield 
C.3 Price comparisons
We have already established that any symmetric wary beliefs equilibrium outcome is more competitive than the monopoly outcome and less competitive than the unique candidate equilibrium with passive beliefs (that is, the unique "contract equilibrium" that resist pairwise deviations). The remaining conditions have been checked using Mathematica.
14 D Resale Price Maintenance: proof of Proposition 8
We show here that with RPM there exists a symmetric equilibrium, with affine wary beliefs based on offered prices, that sustains the monopoly price p M . Note that with RPM, interim observability does not matter, since retail prices are contractually set ex ante.
Receiving an offer (f i , w i ; p i ), R i anticipates that R j has accepted the contract (W (w i , p i ) , F (w i , p i ) ; P (w i , p i )) and accepts the offer if and only if
The beliefs W, F and P must therefore satisfy F (w, p) = (P (w, p) − W (w, p))D(P (w, p) , P (W (w, p), P (w, p))). The Þrst-order conditions are:
β (p − P (W, P )) + (P (w, p) − W (w, p)) ∂P ∂w (W, P ) = 0,
(1 − β) (1 − c) + βw − 2P (w, p) + βP (W, P ) − β (P (w, p) − W (w, p)) ∂P ∂p (W, P ) = 0.
In equilibrium, we must also have P (w * , p * ) = p * and W (w * , p * ) = w * .
• Affine beliefs leading to the monopoly price 14 Mathematica Þle available upon request.
We consider beliefs of the form P (w, p) = α P + ω P w + π P p, W (w, p) = α W + ω W w + π W p, and look for an equilibrium where w * = p * = p M = 1+c 2
. (52) imposes
Then, the Þrst-order conditions lead to:
β (π P − ω P ) (π W + ω W ) − β − 2 (π P + ω P ) (1 − βπ P ) = 0,
β (π P − ω P ) ω W − β + 2ω P (1 − βπ P ) = 0,
β (π P − ω P ) π W + 2π P (1 − βπ P ) = 0.
It is easy to check that (55) = (56) + (57) and (58) = (59) + (60). Equations (59) and (60) lead to:
ω W = β − 2ω P (1 − βπ P ) β (π P − ω P ) and π W = 2π P (1 − βπ P ) β (π P − ω P ) .
Assuming that ω P 6 = 0, compute π P ω P (56) − (57):
Then, rewriting (57) using (61) and (62), it comes:
• Second-order conditions
We now show that one of the two above solutions satisÞes the second-order conditions of the overall program. The manufacturer's maximization program is: Using the linear form of function P , the Hessian matrix only depends on π P and ω P and is equal to
Using equation (62) the matrix can be simpliÞed into:
The four eigenvalues of the matrix H (π P ) are given by:
λ (π P ) = −1 − 2βπ P ± q 1 − 8βπ P + β 2 (1 ± 4π P + 20π 2 P ).
It can then be checked that the matrix H µ 3− √ 9−8β 2 8β ¶ is deÞnite negative (the four eigenvalues are strictly negative). This ensures that there exists a symmetric equilibrium with affine wary beliefs leading to the monopoly prices and proÞt.
